In some of these cases the new expressive forms-electronic music, filmstrips, and computer programs, for example-could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from the outset without the need of new legislation. In the first, scientific discoveries and technological developments have made possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before. The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of works accorded protection, and the subject matter affected by this expansion has fallen into two general categories. The bill avoids this dilemma by using a different phrase-“original works of authorship”-in characterizing the general subject matter of statutory copyright protection. To avoid these equally undesirable results, the courts have indicated that “all the writings of an author” under the present statute is narrower in scope than the “writings” of “authors” referred to in the Constitution. If so, the courts would be faced with the alternative of holding copyrightable something that Congress clearly did not intend to protect, or of holding constitutionally incapable of copyright something that Congress might one day want to protect. Since the present statutory language is substantially the same as the empowering language of the Constitution, a recurring question has been whether the statutory and the constitutional provisions are coextensive. In using the phrase “original works of authorship,” rather than “all the writings of an author” now in section 4 of the statute, the committee’s purpose is to avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field, and to eliminate the uncertainties arising from the latter phrase.

This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.

The phrase “original works or authorship,” which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the courts under the present copyright statute.

The two fundamental criteria of copyright protection-originality and fixation in tangible form are restated in the first sentence of this cornerstone provision.

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